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The (Neglected) Employment Dimension of the World Trade Organization
Steve Charnovitz*

A key assumption underlying the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that its program of
trade negotiations will “strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment,
employment and income growth throughout the world.”1 Indeed, that was the first point included in
the Marrakesh Declaration of April 1994 that consummated the Uruguay Round and established the
WTO. In my view, the WTO truly is strengthening the “world economy”2 and promoting trade and
investment in many parts of the world.3 Yet the rest of the thesis is debatable. Is it necessarily true
that the WTO and the trade negotiations it sponsors are increasing employment and income growth
throughout the world? Indeed, even aggregating the world economy into one planetary unit, one
wonders whether increased trade (and its ensuing dynamic efficiencies) inevitably increases the

* Forthcoming, Social Issues, Globalization and International Institutions: Labour Rights and the
EU, ILO, OECD and WTO (Virginia Leary & Daniel Warner (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2006), available at <http://www.brill.nl/product_id23991.htm).
1

Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, para. 1, available at
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/index.htm>.
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The meaning of “world economy” is ambiguous. It could be the aggregate of all national economies
or the portion of that aggregate involved in or affected by transborder transactions. On the latter
definition, there could be some individuals who live outside the world economy. To “strengthen” an
economy is to assist it to utilize full capacity and to grow.

3

See Anne O. Krueger, Wilful Ignorance: The Struggle to Convince the Free Trade Skeptics, 3 World
Trade Review 483 (2004).
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quantity of global employment. Even if it does, what is the quality of the jobs created? Does the
WTO promote what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls “decent work”4?
Such questions underlie the subject of this article—the neglected employment dimension of
the WTO. As a non-economist, I do not propose to answer these questions empirically. Instead, the
purpose of this article is to point out how little the WTO does to monitor these issues or to design
trade rules with sensitivity to the objective of employment growth. So far, the WTO has not set any
quantitative goals for income or employment growth. The trade ministers have alluded to their desire
that the WTO promote the “benefit and welfare of their peoples,”5 but the ministers are lackadaisical
about keeping WTO negotiations on schedule. In view of the broad nature of international trade law
today, the WTO seems to be overlooking many opportunities to promote a positive employment
agenda.
This article proceeds in four parts: Part I reviews the WTO’s actions, and inactions, on the
issue of employment. Part I also provides an overview of the employment-related provisions of WTO
law. Part II provides an historical context for thinking about the status of employment issues in the
WTO. Part III presents an agenda for incorporating an employment and social dimension into the
work of the WTO. Part IV concludes.
I. The WTO and Employment Policy
In its first decade, the WTO did not show much sensitivity toward the plight of the workers of
the world who produce goods and perform services being traded. Aside from occasional strikes by

4

For a brief discussion of whether “decent work” is the right objective for the ILO’s efforts, see Philip
Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime,
15 EJIL 457, 488–89 (2004. Alston’s article raises important questions about the ILO’s focus on core
labor standards, a topic he returns to in this volume. For an engaging response, see Brian Langille,
Core Labour Rights – the True Story (Reply to Alston), this volume.
5

Marrakesh Declaration, supra note 1, para. 2.
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WTO Secretariat bureaucrats who claim to be underpaid,6 the WTO lacks an employment dimension.
Despite many suggestions that it do so, the WTO did not extend observer status to the ILO pursuant
to Article V of the WTO Agreement.7 Furthermore, the WTO did not sign a “Cooperation
Agreement” with the ILO even though the WTO did sign them with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.8 Although it has set up a Committee on Trade and Development and a
Committee on Trade and Environment, the WTO has not seen fit to establish a Committee on Trade
and Employment.9 Indeed, the topic of employment and labor standards is so much a taboo in the
halls of the WTO that after delegates heard that the Director-General of the ILO had been invited to
speak at the WTO’s 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore, there was so much grumbling that the
chair of the WTO General Council was forced to rescind the invitation.10 That retreat was lamentable
and also symbolic of the distaste of the trading system for matters relating to workers and
employment.

6

See WTO Work to Rule Threat, Financial Times, 23 October 1997, at 8; Frances Williams, WTO
Staff to Step Up Action Over Pay, Financial Times, 10 December 2002, at 16; Frances Williams,
WTO Staff to Disrupt World Bank Meeting, Financial Times, 13 May 2003, at 10.

7

See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), art. V:1.

8

See WTO News, WTO and World Bank Sign Cooperation Agreement, 28 April 1997; Coherence in
Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank,
WT/TF/COH/S/9, Note by the Secretariat, 11 October 2004.
9

Some analysts have commended the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment as a successful
experiment. See e.g., Gregory Shaffer, “If Only We Were Elephants”: The Political Economy of the
WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, in Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D.
Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law. Essays in Honor of Robert E.
Hudec (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 349, 381.
10

Labours of Love, Financial Times, 6 December 1996, at 13; Drusilla K. Brown, International Labor
Standards in the World Trade Organization and the International Labor Organization, The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2000, at 105.
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The Preamble to the WTO Agreement affirms that trade and economic relations should be
conducted with a view to achieving listed goals, including “ensuring full employment . . .”11, and yet
little attention to employment was institutionalized into the operative provisions of the treaty. Article
III of the WTO Agreement states: “With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic
policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.”12
Unfortunately, that provision takes a narrow view of “coherence” in global economic policymaking,
and does not give consideration to employment policymaking. Of course, the WTO Agreement does
affirm that the WTO General Council “shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation
with other intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO.”13
That mandate is sufficient to justify cooperative arrangements with the ILO. But so far the General
Council has not sought or agreed to such an arrangement.
The neglect of employment issues within the WTO seems likely to persist. The WTO website
explains that “there is no work” on the subject of labor standards being carried out at the WTO and it
would be “wrong” to assume that this subject lies ahead.14 This statement refers to labor standards,
however, and not to the broader issue of employment. Yet with very limited exceptions, the same

11

See WTO Agreement, Preamble, para. 2. The language about full employment was lifted directly
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) written in 1947. In its decision in the
Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate Body stated that the Preamble “informs” all WTO covered
agreements. European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 161 (adopted 20 April
2004).

12

WTO Agreement, art. III:5.

13

WTO Agreement, art. V:1. Similar authority is found in GATT arts. XXXVI:7, XXXVIII:2(b)(c);
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), art. XXVI.

14

WTO, Labour Standards: Highly Controversial, available at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm>.
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dismissive attitude seems to exist for employment. The most recent World Trade Report published by
the WTO gives only scant attention to the labor market and job creation.15
Although less than five pages of the 200-page World Trade Report 2004 discuss labor issues,
the substance of this analysis should be noted because it illustrates the WTO’s unsympathetic
attitude. The overall point made is that the “social acceptance of trade reforms” can be a political
constraint to such reform because of “pressure” from employees in import-competing sectors.16 The
Report explains that while other reforms, such as “a reduction of legal minimum wages” will exert
effects “across the economy,” trade liberalization is different because the adjustment costs tend to be
concentrated in particular sectors of the economy.17 This pattern of concentration, it is said, can lead
to “well organized resistance against trade reform.”18 In the Secretariat’s view, the “functioning of
labor markets” has impact both on the size and length of the adjustment burden.19 For example, the
Secretariat warns that “employment protection policies” may “discourage entrepreneurs from hiring
the few workers needed for starting up a new company . . . .”20 Furthermore, it warns that “[h]igh
minimum wages may lead to excessive lay-offs . . . .”21 Another factor the Secretariat analyzes is the
level of unionization in import-competing sectors. The Secretariat explains that higher unionization
may increase resistance to liberalization and lead to “half-hearted adoption of reforms” or, even

15

See WTO, Exploring the Linkage Between the Domestic Policy Environment and International
Trade, World Trade Report 2004. The issue of employment was absent from the World Trade Report
2003.

16

World Trade Report 2004, supra note 15, at 181.

17

Id. at 182.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 183.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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worse, “[trade] policy reversals, with negative consequences for adjustment.”22 Furthermore,
according to the Secretariat, “trade is expected to decrease the demand for unskilled labour in
industrial countries, and to decrease their wages relative to the wages of skilled workers.”23
On a more positive note, the Report briefly discusses the need for “more sophisticated safety
nets” to reduce the adjustment burdens carried by the poorest workers.24 No details are given as to
how to accomplish this.
Three problems are apparent in the Secretariat’s treatment of employment issues. First, by
discussing the labor market merely as a constraint on trade liberalization, the Report seems to regard
international trade as an end in itself rather than a means for humans to improve their happiness. The
central challenge of economic development is how to weave together human resources, capital
investment, technology, management, and good governance. Yet the Secretariat shows little
appreciation for the larger context. Second, the implication in the Report that countries would be
better off with less protection for employment, lower minimum wages, and less unionization shows a
callous disregard for social values espoused by the international community. Third, in one area where
the Secretariat could have collected information on better practices for carrying out worker
adjustment programs, the Secretariat did not offer any useful advice.
In April 2003, the Secretariat published a Special Study on Adjustment by Marc Bacchetta
and Marion Jansen, two staffers in the WTO Secretariat.25 Commissioning this Study was
commendable, and was the first time that such an effort has been undertaken in the multilateral

22

Id.

23

Id. at 185.

24

Id. at 185-86.

25

Marc Bacchetta & Marion Jansen, Adjusting to Trade Liberalization, WTO Special Studies 7, April
2003, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/special_studies_e.htm>.
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trading system. The two authors make no claim that trade liberalization increases employment.26
Instead, they focus on the pockets of industry and job displacement and point out that the adjustment
costs from trade liberalization are likely to be small relative to the gains from trade. The Study
provides a thoughtful handbook of the various policies available to governments to address these
adjustment costs. Oddly, most of the attention in the 60-page study is directed to trade policies for
delaying adjustment, such as WTO transition and phase-in periods, regular safeguards, special
agricultural and textile safeguards, and antidumping duties. By contrast, the option of facilitating
positive worker adjustment is squeezed into three pages.
One of the most perceptive observations in the study is that aid for dislocated workers can
include both (1) short-run assistance to facilitate adjustment and achieve efficiency and (2) long-run
equity transfers to compensate workers for income losses. The Study goes on to explain that tensions
exist between these distinct objectives.27 As someone who worked in the United States on the worker
assistance problem for many years, I believe that this particular insight has often not been appreciated
by analysts who criticize shortcomings in achieving one of these objectives without paying due
attention to the other.
This mild praise for the Study’s contributions on worker adjustment should be leavened by a
brief recital of the Study’s weaknesses. First, it is more of a literature review than a real study, and
the literature reviewed is drawn mainly from trade economists. Second, the Study is not detailed
enough to provide help to a WTO Member government attempting to design programs to assist
workers who lose their jobs as a result of trade. Third, although the authors note that the costs of

26

Id. at 18.

27

Id. at 23, 31 Another thoughtful observation is that making trade commitments in the WTO
enhances the credibility of reform efforts and signals to the factors of production that adjustment will
be necessary. Id. at 39–40.
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adjustment will often be four percent or less of the gains from trade,28 the Study makes no effort to
consider how to channel more of these net gains into aiding dislocated workers.
So far, this article has pointed out how little the WTO has done on the topic of employment.
To be sure, the WTO was set up to be a trade agency, not a labor agency. Nevertheless, one should
recognize that the issue of employment is already embedded to a limited extent in WTO rules, and so
the WTO does have some jurisdictional competence on employment.
Employment Aspects of Current WTO Rules
The WTO Agreement and its annexes do not contain a labor chapter in the way that recent
and emerging United States (U.S.) free trade agreements do.29 Indeed the term “worker” is not even
mentioned in the WTO Agreement, as if the goods in international trade were immaculately
produced. Although there is limited attention to labor, employment, and social matters in the covered
WTO Agreements, no common thread of labor policy can be said to exist. The best way for
explicating the labor-related elements of WTO law is to point out the specific rules in various
agreements.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has several provisions relating to
employment, but all have been neglected. GATT Article XII states a commitment of governments to
pay due regard to the “desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive
resources.”30 Referring to safeguards related to the balance of payments, Article XII also provides a
modicum of deference to domestic policies directed toward the achievement and maintenance of “full

28

Id. at 16–17.

29

See Thomas J. Manley & Luis Lauredo, International Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements in
the Americas, 18 Emory International Law Review 85 (2004).

30

GATT art. XII:3(a). See also GATT art. XVIII:11 first sentence.
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and productive employment.”31 In GATT Part IV, the objective of “social” advancement is noted
alongside “economic” advancement.32 Nothing significant has resulted from any of these provisions.
Employment also plays a role in other WTO agreements covering trade in goods. For the
purpose of invoking trade remedies, the impact of imports on wages and/or employment is a factor in
determining the existence of injury.33 An import-restricting safeguard is to be imposed “only to the
extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.”34 In practice,
however, since the term “adjustment” is not defined, the WTO has not required governments using
safeguards to assure that employers (or their workers) are seeking to adjust to a global economy.35
The WTO rules regarding subsidies also contain some employment policy. Some of these
rules support employment policy. For example, in defining when a domestic subsidy causes “serious
prejudice” to a competing WTO member country, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement) exempts one-time subsidies “to avoid acute social problems.”36 For
developing countries, time-delimited privatization subsidies to cover “social costs” are exempt from
the disciplines on actionable subsidies.37 For all countries, certain subsidies for agricultural training
services are exempt from reduction commitments.38 On the other hand, other substantive rules do not

31

GATT art. XII:3(d).

32

GATT art. XXXVI:1(e).

33

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), art. 15.4; Agreement on
Safeguards, art. 4.2(a); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (Antidumping
Agreement), art. 3.4. A similar reference appears in the now-terminated Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, art. 6.3.

34

Agreement on Safeguards, art. 5.1. See also arts. 7.2, 7.4.

35

See Bacchetta & Jansen, supra note 25, at 50-52 (discussing the Safeguards Agreement).

36

SCM Agreement, art. 6.1(c). A subsidy causing serious prejudice will be actionable.

37

Id. art. 27.13.

38

Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, para. 2(c).
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support employment policy. For example, the rules against export subsidies prohibit the remission of
“social welfare” charges upon exportation.39 For domestic subsidies, a complaining government
cannot claim that a subsidy in one country is displacing or impeding its exports to a third country
when the complaining country has suffered strikes affecting its exports.40 Initially, the SCM
Agreement removed its disciplines on subsidies for a disadvantaged region suffering a spike in
unemployment.41 But that forbearance expired in 2000, and so high unemployment is no longer a
justification for a subsidy.42
Note that all government subsidies for workers or for social costs will be subject to the control
of the Byrd Amendment decision. In that controversial holding, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that
companies suffering injury from dumping or foreign subsidies cannot receive government aid when
the source of the funding are revenues collected via antidumping or countervailing duties.43 This is
the first WTO decision to dictate how a government budgets sources of revenue for carrying out
social policy.
In the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), there are several significant
provisions that cover employment. The GATS provides deference for certain “Labor Markets
Integration Agreements.”44 The GATS directs governments to devise adequate procedures to verify

39

SCM Agreement, Annex I, para. e. This means that a government may not give exporters a rebate
on payroll taxes paid even though rebates may be given on value-added taxes paid.
40

Id. art. 6.7(c). Other grounds for demonstrating serious prejudice would continue to exist.

41

Id. art. 8.2(b).

42

See id. art. 31.

43

United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS217,234/AB/R (adopted 27 January 2003).

44

GATS art. V bis. On the role of bilateral and regional labor agreements, see Virginia Leary, Labor
Migration, in T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail (eds.), Migration and International Legal
Norms (The Hague, Asser Press, 2003), at 227, 229.
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the competence of foreign professionals.45 The GATS directs governments, wherever appropriate, to
work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental
organizations toward “the establishment and adoption of common international standards” for the
practice of service trades and professions.46 The GATS forbids limitations on the total number of
natural persons “that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may
employ . . . ” when such limitations are in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test.47
Furthermore, the labor market is central to GATS because two of the four modes for trade in
services can involve the movement of people.48 Mode 2 is the movement of individuals (and
companies) to consume services in another country (e.g., training). Mode 4 is the movement of
“natural persons” (i.e., individuals) to deliver services in another country (e.g., anti-terrorism
services).
The precise boundary of Mode 4 is yet to be delineated or adjudicated. According to the
GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, the
movement of employees is covered, but the GATS does not apply to measures affecting persons
“seeking access to the employment market” and does not apply to measures regarding “employment
on a permanent basis.”49 These provisions are puzzling because a worker who relocates to another
country as an employee of a company may not be searching for a job, and yet is still statistically part
45

GATS art. VI:6 (in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken).

46

Id. art. VII:5.

47

Id. art. XVI:2(d). This discipline applies only to sectors where market access commitments are
undertaken and may be avoided by inscribing the quota within the national schedule.

48

See GATS art. I:2; B.S. Chimni, Development and Migration, in Migration and International Legal
Norms, supra note 44, at 256, 266.

49

GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services Under the Agreement, paras. 1,
2.
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of the employment market of the receiving country.50 Another unknown is whether the “employment
market” includes the self-employed who may offer various labor services.
Mode 4 of the GATS applies to national law governing entrance into a country (i.e., often
termed “immigration”), the issuance of visas, and the administration of visa quotas. This is implicitly
shown by the Annex’s specific exclusion of measures regarding citizenship and residence,51 and by
the statement in the Annex that GATS “shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to
regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those
measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons
across, its borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or
impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment.”52 In other
words, if immigration measures necessary to protect border integrity are applied so as to impair
specific commitments, then such measures can violate the GATS. The applicability of the GATS to
visas is further clarified by the footnote to Paragraph 4 of the Annex which states that: “The sole fact
of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others shall not be
regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment.”53 What this means is that
the mere existence of a country-specific visa formality (perhaps due to reciprocity) is not in itself to
be considered a nullification of benefits.

50

In other words, she has access already even though she is not seeking access. For example, consider
a transnational corporation that provides childcare services to residents in the United States through
the use of foreign service suppliers who are already employed by the corporation and therefore
arguably not seeking access to the U.S. labor market. The reality is that such a person operates in the
U.S. labor market.

51

Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services Under the Agreement, para. 2.

52

Id. para. 4 (footnote omitted).

53

Id. at n. 13.
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Notwithstanding constitutional authority to do so,54 the GATS Council, to my knowledge, has
not consulted with the most relevant international organizations on employment and migration
regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Mode 4 provisions. Those organizations are
the ILO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However the provisions are
interpreted, it seems likely that the GATS will lead to a greater movement of workers across borders
and some of those workers will decide to stay permanently.
Summary
In summary, during its first decade, the WTO missed numerous opportunities to solidify a
constructive employment dimension. The WTO did not engage in significant cooperation with the
ILO, did not establish a Committee on Trade and Employment, did not tackle the problem of helping
workers adversely affected by trade, and did not reauthorize the exemption for subsidies to highunemployment areas. Even though the current WTO trade negotiations, known as the Doha Round,
is ostensibly about development and poverty alleviation, the WTO has not yet agreed that
employment is crucial to poverty alleviation. United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi Annan
put that matter succinctly in September 2004 when he declared: “After all, the best anti-poverty
programme is employment.”55 Unfortunately, that simple insight has not noticeably influenced
thinking at the WTO.
Given that several provisions in WTO law do pertain to employment, the WTO could have
acknowledged that a labor dimension to WTO law already exists, and thus moved beyond the denial
of a linkage that so often permeates WTO discourse regarding labor. Although past mistakes cannot
be undone, the WTO can outgrow its insularity. Before discussing in Part III what the WTO should
do, Part II will provide some historical context for thinking about social issues in trade policy.
54

GATS art. XXVI.

55

Secretary-General Affirms Commitment to Achieving Fair, Inclusive Globalization, Press Release
SG/SM/9487/DEV/2487 (20 September 2004).
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II. The Awakening of Social Awareness in Trade Policy
As always, the beginning of wisdom in thinking about the future is looking to the past. Both
Adam Smith and Karl Marx shared an understanding that international trade has significant social
implications, with Smith criticizing the pathologies of protection and Marx praising the revolutionary
potential of free trade.56 In the interwar period, the first ILO Director, Albert Thomas, offered a
visionary synthesis of an emerging “world economy” and “new economic organisation” in which
labor protections and free trade are complementary.57
On a multilateral basis, action to regulate trade for social reasons began in the early 20th
century with conventions to restrict trade in sexual services of women (1904) and trade in toxic
phosphorus matches (1906).58 The earliest ILO recommendation on trade came in 1919 with the
Recommendation Concerning the Prevention of Anthrax (No. 3).
The efforts of the League of Nations against economic instability helped to enlighten
pragmatic policymakers regarding the interplay between trade and employment. In 1927, the World
Economic Conference made several recommendations on trade policy and also gave some attention
to rationalization in industry as a means of improving the conditions of labor.59 In 1939, the Bruce
Committee observed the phenomenon of physical, economic, and moral contagion among countries,
and emphasized the need for international cooperation and coordination through “mutual help,”
“exchange of knowledge,” and “association in the work of independent experts,” in contrast to the
56

See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Book IV,
chaps. ii, iii, v; Karl Marx, The Free Trade Congress at Brussels, 1847, available at <
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/09/30.htm>.
57

See Albert Thomas, International Social Policy (Geneva, ILO, 1948), at 108, 114.

58

International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 18 May 1904, 1 LNTS 83;
Convention respecting the Prohibition of the Use of White (Yellow) Phosphorus in the Manufacture
of Matches, 26 September 1906, 99 BFSP 986.

59

See Wallace McClure, National Economic Independence in the Light of the International Economic
Conference, 21 American Journal of International Law 668 (1927).
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technique of “settlement by formal conferences and treaties.”60 Anticipating discoveries by social
scientists several decades in the future, the Bruce Committee suggested that the League of Nations
could contribute by establishing a “platform” for public knowledge and discussion in which direction
would be given “by persons of Government rank directly concerned at home with the subjects of
international discussion.”61 Such transgovernmental cooperation was intended to integrate both
economic and social considerations.62 In 1944, in its Declaration of Philadelphia, the ILO noted the
objective of a broader utilization of the world’s productive resources, including measures to promote
a high and steady volume of international trade, and pledged ILO cooperation with such new
international bodies as may be entrusted with these responsibilities.63 In 1945, when the U.N. Charter
was drafted and approved, one of its provisions called for the United Nations to promote “higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development.”64
These and other milestones over several decades set the stage for the decision by the U.N.
Economic and Social Council in 1946 to convene a Conference on Trade and Employment. The
governments saw trade and employment as twin issues linked in both economics and law.65 Some
negotiators emphasized that high levels of employment could enable trade liberalization and others
60

The Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs, Report of the
Special Committee (Bruce Committee), Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League
of Nations, August 1939, at 7–9, 11. The Chairman of the Committee, S.M. Bruce, was a former
Australian prime minister.

61

Id. at 17. Compare Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 2004) (discussing transgovernmental networks).

62

Bruce Committee Report, supra note 60, at 19.

63

ILO Declaration concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation
(Declaration of Philadelphia), 10 May 1944 (annexed to the ILO Constitution).

64

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, art. 55.

65

See Susan Ariel Aaronson, Taking Trade to the Streets. The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape
Globalization (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2001) at 52–53.
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emphasized that liberalization could strengthen the economy so that more employment could be
achieved.66 Australia was the leading exponent of international undertakings on employment.67
The ensuing Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) put employment
first with a chapter on “Employment and Economic Activity.” The core commitment was for each
member government to “take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive
employment and large and steadily growing demand within its own territory through measures
appropriate to its political, economic and social institutions.”68 Furthermore, the ITO was authorized
to initiate consultations among governments for appropriate measures against the international spread
of a decline in employment, production or demand.69 The Employment chapter also included Article
7 on “Fair Labour Standards” that provided for dispute settlement regarding unfairly low standards in
another country.70 Recognizing the interconnections between the ITO and the ILO, the two
organizations drafted a cooperation agreement in 1948.71
The broad intended scope of the ITO is apparent not only in the ITO’s chapter on
“Employment and Economic Activity”, but also in its chapters on “Economic Development and
Reconstruction” and “Restrictive Business Practices.” Several of the provisions regarding Economic
Development and Reconstruction contain references to employment. For example, Article 10 directs
66

See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) at
105.
67

William Adams Brown, Jr., The United States and the Restoration of World Trade (Washington,
Brookings, 1950) at 95.

68

ITO Charter, art. 3. The text of the ITO Charter is available at
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm>.

69

Id. art. 5.2.

70

Id. art. 7.

71

Proposed Agreement between the International Labour Organisation and the International Trade
Organisation, in ILO, Minutes of the 107th Session of the Governing Body, December 1948, at 169.
The Agreement did not go into force due to the demise of the ITO.
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the ITO to cooperate with other international organizations to provide finance, equipment, technical
assistance, and managerial skills to countries that were still relatively undeveloped.72 Article 11
authorizes the ITO to make recommendations for bilateral or multilateral agreements designed “to
assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from
one Member country to another.”73
For better or worse, the ITO did not come to fruition. Happily, the same U.N. negotiations
spawned the GATT which served as a caretaker for world trade order over the next four decades.
Perhaps in an effort to distance itself from the broad aspirations for the ITO, the GATT stayed away
from employment policy.
To my knowledge, the only employment-related policy engaged in by the GATT was a joint
study with the ILO begun in 1960 to analyze the factors underlying market disruption from textile
imports produced by low-wage workers.74 Without waiting for the study to be completed, the trade
ministers rushed in 1961 to undertake GATT arrangements to limit trade in cotton textiles. Those
harmful arrangements metastasized for many years and were not eliminated until 2005. After the
GATT staff lost interest in cooperative research regarding the international division of labor, the ILO
finalized the study and published it in 1963. The conclusion reached by the ILO was that the problem
of the textile industries in high-wage countries “cannot be primarily attributed to the alleged
unfairness of competition from low-wage underdeveloped countries.”75

72

ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 10.

73

Id. art. 11.2(a)(i).

74

See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT. Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1970) at 298–300.

75

Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade. The Policy Issues (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1966) at 306–07 & n. 63.

18

Unfortunately, the low-wage developing countries seeking to export their cotton and other
apparel have been stymied for over 40 years because the GATT/WTO system has not been ready to
accept the comparative advantage of those countries.76 Indeed, even today, some industrial countries
use high tariffs to thwart such trade. For example, the U.S. government imposes 15 percent tariffs on
many cotton products and 25 percent tariffs on many wool products.
In 1996, the WTO ministers pointed to ILO’s standards as a possible threat to the export
aspirations of developing countries.77 This statement dripped in irony because the blame for the
protectionism of the past 40 years cannot be attributed to labor standards or to the ILO. Instead of
isolating itself from the ILO, WTO should recognize that the ILO can help it overcome national fears
about import competition.
III. A Positive Employment Agenda for the WTO
The most important contribution the WTO can make to raising standards of living would be to
tear down the protectionist walls between economies. Liberalizing trade is hardly sufficient for
achieving human dignity and other social goals of the community. But trade liberalization is a
constructive policy in an interdependent world economy because it typically increases purchasing
power in each country. Although the GATT and WTO have done a lot to remove protection, a great
deal more remains to be done—particularly in developing countries that have the greatest need for an
76
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economic boost from trade. Quite perversely, the developing countries are often the most resistant to
liberalization.
Protectionism is not an effective or ethical response to any market failure; instead, it is a
manifestation of government failure as politically powerful rent-seeking interests are requited with
border restrictions.78 Although trade ministers can agree to a rhetorical rejection of protectionism,79
many of them remain eager to partake at home. Eradicating protectionism is a difficult political
challenge for governments, and so the WTO should welcome outside offers to help.
Although the WTO epistemic community tends to look at employment as an output generated
by trade negotiations, this view is incomplete in two respects. First, it fails to consider that high levels
of employment within countries may be a necessary input for successful trade negotiations. That
insight animated the founders of the postwar trading system who wrote the Employment chapter of
the ITO Charter. Second, the current WTO program fails to consider the ways in which WTO rules
may interfere with using employment policy at the national level to counter market failures and to
increase investment in human capital. The WTO also fails to consider ways in which its cooperation
with other international organizations, such as the ILO, could help those organizations achieve their
own functional objectives.
Worker Adjustment Assistance
A recognition that governmental assistance to workers can be a complementary policy to trade
liberalization goes back to the first half of the 20th century, but has not yet emerged in an
intergovernmental treaty. So far, only soft law exists. In 1976, at the World Employment Conference,
the governments, workers, and employers agreed to a Declaration which, among many points, states
that governments should provide worker adjustment assistance “in order to facilitate the
78

Smith, supra note 56, chap. ii. He takes note of the way that “partial interests” direct and intimidate
the legislature, moving it away from the general good.

79

See, e.g., Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 1 (adopted 20 November 2001).

20

establishment of new economic relations between developing and developed nations.”80 The
Declaration further states that the worker delegates felt that in the context of multilateral trade
negotiations, the ILO could “contribute to the improvement of an international safeguard system
covering employment and income guarantees, fair labour standards and adjustment assistance.”81 In
1985, the GATT Eminent Persons Group recommended that safeguard actions “be linked with
adjustment assistance including help, where necessary, to ease the transfer of workers.”82 In 2005, the
WTO Consultative Board to the Director-General explained that
“adjustment assistance programmes reflect the political need to offset the social impact of trade
liberalization which would otherwise not be politically sustainable.”83 The Board lamented that the
WTO “says practically nothing, even by way of exhortations, to WTO Members and to aid-giving
institutions, on adjustment assistance.”84 To achieve greater “horizontal coordination” on adjustment,
the Board recommended that international development agencies, in close cooperation with the WTO
and other agencies, undertake programs to fund adjustment assistance for developing countries.85 The
need for adjustment programs may be greater in developing countries, than in industrial countries,
because some developing countries (such as China) face huge transitional problems as the
agricultural population exits from subsistence farming.
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Over the years, trade adjustment programs have typically been ineffectual and are regularly
criticized by economists and derided by labor unions.86 Such programs have remained ineffective
because their presumptive constituency—workers, employers, and free traders—are often
uninterested in a pro-adjustment approach.87 This is not true of all academic economists however.88
For example, in a recent book on the WTO, Kent Jones explained that “Governments have the
responsibility to make sure that the policy environment facilitates adjustment to trade. . . . The easier
it is for a displaced worker to find a new job, the less will be her trepidation about trade and the
WTO.”89 Jones does not recommend any specific action by the WTO toward that end however.
Beyond the academy, one thoughtful study was written a few years ago by Cletus C. Coughlin, a vice
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, who pointed out the need to reduce the cost for
those harmed by trade.90
Worker adjustment programs are controversial in several respects: One issue is whether there
should be specific programs targeted at workers hurt by trade, or instead more general programs to
86
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help all workers who suffer from structural unemployment. Another issue is whether adjustment
programs are worth the public monies being spent on them. Although a full discussion of these issues
is beyond the scope of this article, let me briefly offer my own views. If governments undertook
active labor market programs for all workers who needed them, then there would be no need for
categorical programs for trade-affected workers. Conversely, when generally-available programs are
absent or spotty (which is the condition in nearly all countries), the ideal of treating workers equally
is not a good reason to refrain from some groups of workers. In other words, do not let the best be
the enemy of the good.
The challenge of effectiveness is a much deeper problem because evaluations sometimes do
not show a significant positive impact for retraining. Recognizing, however, how little resources and
management attention have been devoted to such programs over the past 25 years, I am not surprised
by the disappointing results. In my view, society can help the structurally unemployed if we try. The
task is not just only for governments however; companies and workers themselves need to be
engaged in the process. Thus, I agree with a statement in a recent Paper published by the World Bank
that “Despite the mixed evaluation picture, governments have little choice but to use active
programming as one instrument in their response to the economic and social problems associated
with unemployment and poverty in the labor force.”91
Based on the U.S. experience, one mistake that has been made is to assume that adjustment
programs can be effectively implemented by the public sector. Instead, I would opt for a model of
privatization of active labor market programs whereby individuals who need services are empowered
with government-issued vouchers which individuals combine with their own money to purchase
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needed services. The government could encourage individual saving for that purpose through the tax
system.
A WTO Decision on Trade and Employment
As a focal point for its new efforts, the WTO should enact a Decision on Trade and
Employment to better institutionalize the employment issue in WTO policy. Such a Decision could
include one or more of the following specifics:
Restate the principle from the ITO Charter92 that the avoidance of unemployment is not
of domestic concern alone, but is also a condition for achieving the general purposes of
the trading system.



Exhort WTO Members to establish programs to assist dislocated workers and propose
that appropriate international organizations—such as the ILO and the World Bank—
promote informational hubs and technical assistance for counseling, retraining, mobility
assistance, and wage insurance. Governments need help in knowing what the better
practices are. The Decision might recall the endorsement of adjustment programs by the
World Summit for Social Development.93


Propose that the World Bank set up a fund for developing countries to assist them in
providing adjustment aid to workers dislocated by globalization. The Decision might
recall that the idea of such international funding originated at the World Employment
Conference in 1976.94


Propose that an independent mechanism be set up to collect data on the efficacy of
national adjustment programs and to evaluate those programs, and then to put those
results on the WTO website.


Propose that experimentation in social safety nets be encouraged through an
international prize to be awarded to the most innovative and successful programs.


Hold GATS negotiations to lower barriers to trade in worker adjustment services.95 If
service deliverers see a large international market in delivering such services to
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workers, more providers will get involved and their performance will be strengthened
through competition.
Expand the WTO research program and direct the WTO to work with the ILO and the
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development to examine the impact of trade on the
quantity and quality of employment, and the gender implications of this impact.96 The
Decision might recall that this recommendation for joint research was made by the
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization.97


Establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment.98 The Committee should be
asked to examine whether WTO rules unduly constrain adjustment programs and
national employment promotion policies. The Decision should invite the ILO to
participate in the new Committee through a tripartite delegation. The Committee should
also formulate measurable objectives for the WTO regarding world employment
growth.


Consider the advisability of amending GATT rules to allow any country to impose a
small uniform fee on imports for the purpose of using the revenue from such a fee to
fund programs for adjustment assistance.99


In my view, the remit of a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment should be limited to these
issues and should not include the two controversial topics discussed below—worker migration and
fair labor standards.100

96

See Eugenia McGill, Poverty and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent
Approach?, 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 371 (2004).

97

World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization (Geneva, ILO,
2004), para. 628. James Salzman has argued that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development can also play a useful role in research on this topic. James Salzman, Labor Rights,
Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 769 (2000). Salzman takes issue with
my criticisms of the OECD’s first study on the trade-labor connection. Id. at 799 n. 75.
98

I urged this in 1995. See Steve Charnovitz, Strengthening the International Employment Regime, 30
Intereconomics 221, 233 (1995).
99

At the direction of the U.S. Congress, the President undertook negotiations in 1988 to amend the
GATT in this way, but the negotiations proved unsuccessful. See 19 USCS § 2397 note.

25

Worker Migration
Commitments in trade agreements regarding the movement of people began as early as the
year 1217, and have often been included in modern treaties on friendship, commerce, and
navigation.101 At the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment in 1948, the governments approved
a Resolution suggesting that the U.N. Economic and Social Council, in conjunction with the ILO,
consider the problems of temporary or seasonal migration of workers for the purpose of formulating
conventions and model bilateral agreements so that governments may coordinate their actions to
ensure mutually advantageous arrangements and fair conditions for the workers concerned.102 After
1948, the issue of worker migration disappeared from the global trade agenda.
Attention to the temporary movement of workers is one of the most positive features of the
GATS. So far, the commitments made by governments have been meager.103 Perhaps the ongoing
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Doha Round will deepen those commitments.104 Allowing greater movement of persons delivering
services can aid the economies of both sending and receiving countries, and can also help individual
workers enhance their self-fulfillment. In the past few years, many analysts have taken note of the
constructive potential of WTO negotiations on Mode 4.105 Freedom of movement for workers (and for
students consuming educational services) should be a high priority, even in a time of heightened
border insecurities.
In 2004, the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization pointed out “the
lack of a coherent framework for the cross-border movement of people.”106 The Commission
recommended the initiation of a preparatory process towards an institutional framework for the
movement of people across national borders that would be similar to multilateral frameworks that
already exist (or are under discussion) for goods, services, technology, investment, and
information.107 In my view, a multilateral framework is truly needed and should involve better
coordination between the WTO, the ILO, and the IOM.108
Fair Labor Standards
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The third area of employment policy where the WTO could do more is labor standards.109
Back in 1948, a provision on “Fair Labour Standards” was included in the ITO Charter and intended
to be part of the trading system.110 This is still a good idea, as there are many trade-related labor
issues—such as the working conditions in export processing zones—that are not currently being dealt
with by the WTO.111 In recent months, the U.S. government has brought up the issue of core labor
standards during country reviews in the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism.112
In the ITO Charter of 1948, the governments evinced a recognition that “all countries have a
common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity,
and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit.”113 That
sentence contains several important thoughts: One is that improvements in productivity may enhance
labor standards and wages. Another is that high labor standards not justified by productivity may not
be beneficial. Another is that nations share a common interest in higher labor standards.
No intergovernmental declaration on labor standards emanated from the trading system after
1948 for almost 50 years. Then in 1996 the WTO trade ministers at Singapore declared: “We renew
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our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards.”114 The WTO
Ministers at Singapore further stated that “The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the
competent body to set and deal with these [core] standards, and we affirm our support for its work in
promoting them.”115 That the ILO is the competent body for labor standards is obvious, and no one
has seriously argued that the WTO should poach on that turf. Although the statement by the Ministers
is unobjectionable on its face, many analysts and stakeholders did object that the Ministers did not do
anything tangible to support the ILO’s work.116
Because the nations of the world have a common interest in improving labor standards, they
also share an interest in assuring that the WTO and the ILO work cohesively. The linkages are
numerous: Emancipating international trade will increase productivity which should tend to raise
labor standards. Improving labor conditions in countries notorious for worker rights abuses will make
it easier for those countries to export to consumers who care about the condition of the workers
making the goods they buy.117 Raising worker productivity will expand output and enable countries
to better compete in trade. These potential synergies need to be developed in a way that will allow the
trade regime to help the labor regime.
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The relevance of labor policy to trade policy is actually just a subset of the broader relevance
of labor policy to economic policy.118 Workers are the most valuable resource a country has for its
development, and yet too often during the 1970s and 1980s, active labor market programs for
workers were neglected by the World Bank. Several years ago, the World Bank recognized the gap in
its own efforts, and began to devote attention and resources to social protection and labor markets.119
A holistic vision was put forward in 1981 in the encyclical Laborem Exercens. Pope John
Paul II stated that “it is respect for the objective rights of the worker . . . that must constitute the
adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy, both on the level of the
individual society and State and within the whole of the world economic policy and of the systems of
international relationships that derive from it.”120 The Pope referred to the ILO, and not the GATT,
but surely the WTO today is one of the systems of international relationships that derive from the
world economy.
Worker rights are now off the negotiating table at the WTO and likely to remain so for many
years. Several reasons exist, but a major cause is surely Bill Clinton who as U.S. President confided
to a reporter the coercive path he favored for worker rights at the WTO. Just before he arrived at the
WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in late 1999, Clinton said that he favored a WTO working
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group to devise a set of core labor standards for trade agreements that would be enforced through
trade sanctions.121
The misplaced motivation of Clinton’s remark touched off a firestorm of opposition within
the WTO and was a factor in the failure of the Seattle Conference. By December 1999, it had become
apparent that the issue of labor standards in the WTO was delicate, and no progress could be made in
any proposal that endorsed trade sanctions as a way to enforce labor standards. Opinions differ on
what Clinton’s motivation was for making his incendiary remarks; perhaps he just misspoke.
Whatever its rationale, Clinton’s comment swept away the progress that had been made in the
preceding years in explaining how the WTO could take up the issue of labor standards without
committing to a sanction-based approach.
Several possibilities exist. For trade in goods, one can imagine a greater use of international
product standards to guarantee that goods are produced under healthy working conditions. The WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) calls on governments to use relevant international
standards where they exist.122 Although the TBT Agreement appears to have been written carefully to
preclude standards based on working conditions,123 the TBT definitions are written loosely enough
for an expansive interpretation should governments want to do so. For trade in services, one can
imagine stitching together several GATS provisions to promote specified labor standards in services
sectors.124 Indeed, David Richardson, a well known trade economist, has suggests that the GATS
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could be expanded to cover market-supportive regulation regarding labor policies.125 His proposal
suggests a WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Worker Agency Services to cover freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining.
If labor standards do not come into the WTO as a discrete trade issue, they may come in
instead as a “human rights” issue. Because the United States has never pressed for its inclusion into
the WTO, human rights does not carry the same baggage that labor rights carries. To be sure, the
WTO member governments that have been so defensive about worker rights, such as India, might be
similarly antagonistic to human rights as a trade goal. But given the commitment within the United
Nations and in many countries to the primacy of human rights, one cannot easily predict the outcome
of a concerted effort to add a human rights dimension to the WTO. In recent years, many analysts
have written about human rights as a WTO issue in a favorable light.126 Others decry the idea of
taking human rights into account at the WTO preferring to limit the arenas in which human rights can
be pursued. How this tension plays out will be interesting to watch. It may be that when the issue of
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core labor standards eventually enters the WTO, it does so under the banner of human rights, rather
than as a distinct objective.127
IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the WTO adopt a durable employment dimension
and to propose key elements for it. The Preamble of the WTO makes a bow to “ensuring full
employment,” but none of the actual rules drafted during the Uruguay Round do anything concrete to
achieve this goal. Expanding the level of international trade may increase worker remuneration and
purchasing power, but trade is a blunt instrument for governments to use to combat structural
unemployment and chronic poverty.
Instead, governments need to use appropriate employment policy. The difficulty, however, is
that because of perceived international competition, governments may not implement the
employment and labor policies that would be optimal for them. Similarly, dysfunctions in
employment policy can hinder trade negotiations. Because of perceived unfairness in trade due to
horrible labor conditions in some countries, governments may resist the acceptance of goods
produced under such conditions. Because of labor market failures that prevent redundant workers
from getting reemployed, governments may drag their feet in implementing trade liberalization.128
Furthermore, WTO rules on subsidies may encroach on the policy space needed by governments.
The existence of these international interactions between trade and labor provide the
justification for a comprehensive international policy to manage the trade-labor connection. One
element is to prevent WTO rules from interfering with legitimate labor policy at the national level.
Another is maintain a proper balance between economic and social factors of development. Another
is to promote the employment and social preconditions for trade liberalization. Not all aspects of such
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policies need to be addressed within the WTO, but even the ones outside the WTO’s competence
might benefit from some WTO involvement.
Twenty years ago, I observed that jobs were replacing gold as the modern measure of a
favorable balance of trade.129 What I meant was that poor outcomes in the labor market would
become more of a constraint on the ability of governments to liberalize.130 I was not suggesting that
only exports create jobs, or that imports always destroy jobs. If such effects actually occurred, that
would turn the trade equation into a zero-sum employment game. Surely that view of trade ignores
both theory and reality.
Looking back, my observation was a tad too pessimistic. In the intervening years, many
governments have liberalized trade, often in the face of high unemployment. Nevertheless, a great
deal more liberalization remains to be accomplished in the years ahead.
Poor domestic and international policies on employment creation will continue to be a drag on
the ability of governments and societies to embrace the benefits of trade liberalization. To remedy
this situation, the WTO should admit that the aspirations about employment in the Preamble to the
WTO Agreement cannot be satisfactorily achieved without the use of social policy instruments at
both the domestic and the international levels. As a first step, the WTO’s shadowy employment
dimension should be better developed so that the WTO works with other international agencies to
help countries recover from globalization-induced unemployment.
Just as international trade policy is too important to be left to the WTO, international
employment policy is too important to be left to the ILO (or to meetings of the G-8 Labor and
Employment Ministers). In my view, the WTO itself has a complementary role to play. Furthermore,
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governments need to enhance the coordination of multilateral organizations so that interconnected
economic and social goals can be integrated and promoted more successfully. The world community
took up this task 60 years ago in the establishment of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (at the
suggestion of the Bruce Committee). Sadly, the integration of social and economic objectives remains
in its infancy. Going forward, such integration will also need to take account of environmental
objectives.
In discerning the right path forward, governments and stakeholders can benefit by learning
from history. A key development was the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment of 1946–48
and the creation of the GATT. These multilateral efforts to construct economic and social
governance had roots in an earlier era of institution-building when the ILO and League of Nations
were created. The unique mission of the ILO called for a new building for which the foundation stone
was installed with great ceremony in 1923 . That impressive structure, named for the internationalist
William Rappard, now houses the WTO. When the foundation stone was laid down, ILO Director
Albert Thomas placed a piece of parchment under the stone on which a motto for the ILO had been
inscribed. The motto is: “Si vis pacem, cole justitiam.” If you wish for peace, cultivate justice.131
That’s a good motto for the ILO and would be a good motto for the WTO.132 In the 21st century, let
us renew global efforts to achieve those timeless aspirations.
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